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-V.—DISCUSSIONS.
PROF. PERRY'S REALISM.
I AM very sorry that my discussion of Present Philosophical Ten-
dencies in No. 86 has not met with Prof. Perry's approval.1 I
regret this the more that my attitude towards ' realism' was not
intended to be unsympathetic. For I have always valued it as a
salutary antidote to the ambiguity, deceptiveness and destruotive-
ness of the ' Idealism' with which we are afflicted, I discussed,
however, points of difference rather than of agreement, because I
recognised in Prof. Perry a philosopher who had really at heart the
clearing up and not the evading of issues. I therefore concentrated
on the three issues as to whioh there is most confusion in the
philosophic world, viz., what is the meaning of metaphysical
realism, and how and where precisely does the common-sense
realism we all affirm in our actions pass into metaphysics? what is
the essential meaning of pragmatism ? and what is the main tendenoy
of James's philosophy ? and only just mentioned others of the many
interesting discussions contained in Prof. Perry's book. I hoped
by so doing to elicit from Prof. Perry further elucidations of
points that he did not seem to me to have made good, and in this
hope I am glad to find I have not been mistaken. And it is
rather with the aim of promoting further explanations from one
whom I conceive most competent and willing to give them, than in
order to attack his new 'realism,' or to confess to misappre-
hensions into which I cannot see that I have fallen, that I venture
to set forth rather more fully some of the difficulties Prof. Perry's
system presents to my eyes.
I.
(1) My initial difficulty is to comprehend why Prof. Perry
should attach such inordinate importance to the philosophic con-
troversy between (so-called) 'realism' and (so-called) 'idealism1.
It has become for him (as for other ' neo-reahsts') an obsession
which absorbs all other questions, in a way that seems neither
fair to the others nor healthy for philosophy. Like Aaron's rod it
swallows up all else. Now I would not for a moment question
any philosopher's right to interest himself in whatever he pleases,
1
 Cf. Nu 83.
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PBOF. PERRY'S BEAIJISM. 387
but if he wants to interest others, he should at least give reasons
for his partiality. In Prof. Perry's case the reasons (whatever
they are) are not made sufficiently apparent to me. He merely
seems to assume that philosophic self-respect is impossible until
one has finally committed oneself dogmatically either to ' realism'
or to ' idealism'. These he takes to be the only possible meta-
physical beliefs about ultimate reality. But where is the proof of
the urgency of this deoision? Prima facie there seems to be no
need to come to a decision about ultimate reality at all. If there
were, how could most of us carry on the ordinary business of life at
all, seeing that society does not hire us to be professionals in meta-
physics, and we have not the leisure to be amateurs? We are
forced therefore to get on, pragmatically, with provisional work-
ing views of reality. These are in fact used and acted on by all
philosophers also, although they profess to despise them theoretic-
ally. They appear however to differ in kind, and in the methods
by which they are established and conserved, from the theories pro-
fessed by moat philosophers. It is necessary, therefore, to show
what is the connexion between these working beliefs and the more
pretentious theories of the philosophers.
Moreover, even in theory, a case for metaphysical dogmatising
has to be made out. Is it not possible to hold that a decision, in
the present state of our knowledge, is entirely premature, and to
reply to the dogmatist ' there will be time enough to make up one's
mind about the nature of ultimate reality on the day of the last judg-
ment ' ? Why then should it be assumed that either ' realism ' or
' idealism' must be absolute and final truth, and that either the
realist or the idealist must be able to prove his thesis ? Why should
we not remember that metaphysics are highly speculative enter-
prises in which it is unwise to invest one's whole capital, and
which a prudent man takes to only with many reservations and
grains of common-sense?
Especially in this case, where the controversial situation reveals
a mass of paradoses and pitfalls to the candid questioner. Bow
can he shut his eyes to the fact that both ' realism ' and ' idealism '
are used in a highly ambiguous manner, and usually left undefined ?
Even if definitions of the terms implicated were to be had, they
would be of little use, because neither party would accept those
propounded by the other, so that the familiar device of ' proving '
one's case by laying down a definition and refusing to discuss
whether it applies to anything, here breaks down. Nay more, the
disputants themselves are driven to confess that they cannot ' prove
their thesis '. For no evidence exists which can decide in favour
of either contention, nor any direction in which crucial experiment
can be looked for. Should it not at least be proved, therefore, that
either thesis is worth proving ? To me the situation seems strongly
to suggest that the issue is a false one, and that neither metaphysical
4
 idealism' nor metaphysical' realism' is true, but that (as conceived)
 at Stockholm
s U







388 F. C. S. SCHILLER:
both are unmeaning. Critical examination in detail points to the
same conclusion, and to a solution which ought not to be called
1
 idealism ' any more than ' realism ' (cf. Sub (2)). At any rate I can
see no- occasion in this metaphysical dispute for any display of
warmth or fanaticism, nor any reason for thinking that a philosopher
who inclines to ' half-realism ' or',half-idealism,' with whole-hearted
caution, is not more likely to be right than the ' whole-hoggers'
who plunge into extremes.
(2) I cannot quite make out Prof. Perry s attitude towards ' the
Ego-centric Predicament,' and observe that it has puzzled others
also.1 But I was, of course, delighted to read his unequivocal pro-
nouncements that " nothing can be argued from " the Bgo-oentrio
Predicament,1 and that he did " not pretend to escape " from its
" embarrassments ".' For the first was a point I made in Biddies
of the Sphinx over twenty years ago,4 while the second is one of my
reasons for thinking that a formulation of the problem which is
unable to extricate itself from this predicament is a mistaken one.
Nor is Prof. Perry rigbt in supposing that I attributed to him the
audacity of arguing from the very embarrassment which his ' pre-
dicament ' caused him to the truth of realism. He showed his
' embarrassment ' far too clearly, and my point is rather that the
predicament is and remains as embarrassing to metaphysical realism
as solipsism is and remains to metaphysical idealism. But it does
not seem to me to be proper merely to look this ' embarrassment'
boldly in the tace, and to pa3s on as if it did not exist. For though
I admit that no argument for ' idealism ' should be drawn from the
' predicament,' I cannot think that strictly nothing follows from
it. It seems to follow that no evidence for a strictly transcendent
reality can be obtained, and that such realisms as refuse to live
without one are doomed to iirationality/' That is a pretty im-
portant conclusion in its bearing on the whole controversy, and its
moral (to me) is that we should do well to mean by ' realism'
something that is not absurd.
I find moreover some difficulty in understanding Prof. Perry's
treatment of the Ego-centric predicament as a whole. Unless
he regards it as somehow more than a refutation of a bad idealistic
argument, why does it figure so largely in his pages? For if
he (and I) are right about it, the argument for ' idealism,' based
on it simply ceases to be relevant, and could be dismissed in a
couple of lines. Yet I am loth to believe that it owes its pride
of place simply to its jaw-breaking technicality. I have a lurking
suspicion, therefore, that Prof. Perry imagines that by clearing
1
 E g. Messrs. J. B. Pratt and C. I. Lewis, Journ. of Phil , is., 21,
and x , 2.
1
 MIMD, No. 88, p. 545. ' Jmirn. of Phil., x., 457.
*Cf. also Proc. Aristotelian Soc, l'JIO, p. 2-'l.
* Whether Prof Perry's realiuin is ono of these is not, perhaps, quite
clear, and is a point which may be reserved
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PROF, PERRY'S REALISM. 389
away this idealistic argument he has somehow strengthened
the position of realism. This would of course in a sense follow if
' realism ' and ' idealism ' were the sole alternatives, and he could
appeal to quite a number of logicians who still teach that a hy-
pothesis can be ' proved ' by disproving all the alternatives one has
thought of (or chosen to notice) up to date. But seeing that in
this case a third alternative has been definitely formulated, which
is not 'embarrassed ' by the ' predicament,' it seems very unsafe to
argue thus. And at any rate I think Prof. Perry would do well to
explain away the verbal conflict which at present may be found in
his saying both that the Ego-centric Predicament " throws no light
on any question,"1 and also that Berkeley's argument from it
" calls attention to a situation whioh undoubtedly exists and that
is one of the most important original discoveries that philosophy has
made ".*
But I pass to something more important, vis., the ' correlation
theory of the relation of subject and object, which appears to
me to be naturally suggested by the facts and not to suffer from
the ' embarrassments ' either of ' realism ' or of ' idealism '. True,
it has been olaimed for the latter by idealists over-anxious to esoape
from the ' embarrassment' of solipsism. But why should Prof.
Perry accept their claim, and even argue for it ? Merely because
by lumping it with more questionable forms of ' idealism ' he can
avoid disoussing a theory it would be hard to refute directly?
Or because, like others who have cultivated an absolutist temper,
he instinctively shrinks from anything that smacks of relativity ?
•At any rate it seems a clear abuse of language to call it ' idealism '.
For surely on this theory neither subject nor object can claim
' priority,' each being meaningless without the other. And is not
' idealism ' reduced to inanity, if it ceases to claim ' priority' for
mind?
But let us consider Prof. Perry's argument about this unwarranted
extension of' idealism'. He asks how on the ' correlation' theory
we are to discover 'what difference the correlation makes to the
inferior substitute for an ' object' which the theory allows. But
why should we want to know ? If there are no objects except in
relation to minds, and no minds, except in relation to objects, the
question is unmeaning. Has not Prof. Perry here assumed his
own sense of ' object' and asked a question in terms of it ? Again,
he seems to think that because ' objects' are many and ' mind ' is
one, mind is a 'constant,' and that "to determine the real, as
distinguished from the methodological place of mind in the world "
forms an insoluble problem. But a ' mind ' that can be properly
said to be a ' constant' (in any but a verbal sense) is quite un-
known to psychology, which has discovered that minds are even
more fluid and unstable than ' objects,' and is unnecessary in any
philosophy which has learnt from James that change is real and
1
 MIWD, loc cit., p. 646. • Prtttnt Phil. Ttmd., p. 129
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890 F. c. s. SCHILLEB:
that reality does not connote rigidity. And why after all should
we wish ' to determine the real as distinguished from the method-
ological ' function of either ' mind' or ' object' ? Why should not
the methodological (i.e. pragmatic; reality be the only reality that
exists ? It is the only reality we can know we have, or can use
in any science. Once more Prof. Perry seems to create a difficulty
for himself by importing into an alien theory a sense which can
exist only in' his own. At any rate it seems clear that his failure
to appreciate the third alternative presented by the correlation view
leaves a large lacuna in his argument.
(3) My difficulties with the doctrine of the ' independence of the
immanent' arise primarily from the fact that ' independence ' is not
defined, or at least that no evidence is alleged that anything (except
the case in dispute) exists which conforms to its definition. Now
this does not in the least surprise me, for when some years ago I
endeavoured to discover what philosophers meant by ' independent,'
I elicited no response'; whence it was easy to infer that' independ-
ent ' is one of those terms which are most useful when their meaning
can be made to vary as required. Nor does Prof. Perry help me; for
though in The New Realism (pp. 104-105), he candidly admits that
the situation is discreditable, he doesnot goon to expound directlythe
meaning of ' independence,' but attempts a classification of the sorts
of ' dependence'. This implies, what does not seem to be the case,
that ' independence' is merely the negation of ' dependence'; also,
what is more serious, that it is possible to give an exhaustive list
of the forms of ' dependence \ s For if this be not achieved, it will
be possible that an unrecognised form of ' dependence' is reckoned
as ' independence,' and an illusory proof of ' independence' is thus
generated. Again while I should applaud Prof. Perry's contention
(Joe. cit., p. 114) that it is inconvenient to identify ' dependence ' and
' relation ' as ' idealists' have done, I yet fail to see how in the
end he can get rid of the contention that the specific relation-of-
an-object-to-a-knower may be, and is, a relation of 'dependence,'
otherwise than by a dogmatic Machtspruch. And logically this
would of course be a form of begging the question. He may,
nevertheless, be right; only one would like to hear reasons. To
assert therefore that "entities are independent unless they are
proved dependent,"3 is to go far beyond his brief; it can be inferred
only (as in the similar case of the chemical ' elements') that entities
which have not yet been proved dependent ('composite') may be
'independent' ('elementary').4
As regards the relation 6 of the ' immanent' to the ' transcen-
dent ' real, it would be a boon to have from Prof. Perry a full dis-
1
 Arist. Soe. Proe., 1909, pp. 86-87, cf. Stxulies in HumanUm, pp. 96-98.
»Despite The New Realism, p. 122. *Loc. cit., p. 122. J Ibid.
* I now find that my doubts about Prof. Perry's ' proof' of ' inde-
pendence ' have been felt also by others, e.g. by Prof. WnmerFite (Journ.
of Phil., i., 546).
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PROF, PERRY'S REALISM. 391
oussion of both these terms and of the meanings of ' transcendent'.
It has always been supposed that metaphysical ' realism ' involves
the assertion of transcendene reals in some sense. But in what sense ?
And how do they ' transcend ' ? What moreover relates the ' imma-
nent ' real to its ' transcendent' double ? Again no answers are ex-
tant, and again I must confess to failure to extract any.1 Now it has
long been supposed that in this doctrine of the transcendence of
the real lay a fatal weakness of realism, and that the transition
from the immanent to the transcendent formed for it a mauvais
pas to be traversed only by a leap inspired by a pragrnatio and
desperate will to believe. If therefore Prof. Perry will kindly dis-
avow the belief in a transcendent reality, he will do realism a great
service and smooth down many scruples.
(4) I wish Prof. Perry would argue in favour of his conviction
that knowing is inherently ' subjectivistic,' and that to view things
4
 knowledge-wise ' s for ever debars one from recognising ' reality '
in any sense. For nothing appears to me more plainly contrary
to fact. All the ' realities ' we talk and dispute about seem mani-
festly to emerge from processes of cognition and to be established
in their status by being discriminated from the unrealities and illu-
sions with which they were at first associated and confused. Now
as Prof. Perry admits (as I understand him) that our reals are known
reals, why should he continue to conceive their inevitable relation
to a knower as a disparagement and a taint ? Especially as he
conoeives himself to have shown that relation to a mind need not
destroy an object's ' independence'. Surely his bias merely serves
to discredit our truths, without exalting reality into any more
assured position.
(5) As regards the positive evidenoe for Prof. Perry's realism he
apparently agrees with his critics that most of his ' proofs ' are not
conclusive, although he does not explain why, if so, he rehearses
them at such length. But he claims conclusiveness for the
argument from the reality of the environment and the pressure it
exercises on the mind. The facts here may be admitted, but his
inferences from them seem disputable. Is the ' reality' implied
in the biological method really such as Prof. Perry's realism de-
mands, or is it the familiar ' pragmatic ' reality used by so many
of the sciences ? Prof. Perry's contempt for ' half-realism' has
prevented him from arguing this point, and so establishing his
position ; but until he has, it seems safer to suppose that a prag-
matic reality suffices. This seems the more advisable as we have
here got on to ground where philosophy demands a reinterpretation
of common-sense realism and an advance beyond it. Its duty is
to consider all the available facts, and not merely to select from
them the materials with which a working view of the world can
be constructed. Now it is a fact, though most philosophers shy at
1
 In the same paper in the Aritt. Soc. Proc., pp. 95-98.1
 Cf. Prtttnt Ttndeneiu, p. 217.
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it, that there exist, alongside of the world we believe ourselves to
know in normal waking life, an indefinite number of dream-worlds
and ' hallucinations,' etc., which exhibit the same structural prin-
ciples, and cannot be denied ' reality ' in the widest sense of the
term. The things we encounter in these experiences claim ' objec-
tivity ' and ' independence ' in precisely the same way as the ' real'
things, and are often very difficult to distinguish from them.
Soienoe, in its pragmatic way, may rightly neglect them, but every
philosophic synthesis must accommodate them somehow.1 For
their existence raises the deepest questions. Is all experience ' of '
reality, or is all reality illusory ? It becomes possible, nay neces-
sary, to doubt the finality of our chosen ' real things,' and to ask
whether our real- world also may not be a ' dream '. This doubt is
of great antiquity,* and philosophers have never succeeded in dis-
posing of it. I have endeavoured to expound its great theoretic
importance in chapter xx. of Studies in Humanism, but it is still
commonly ignored. Prof. Perry too simply ignores it, together
with all the difficulties occasioned to realism by the whole realm
of hallucinatory, illusory, erroneous and dream-experiences.' Once
more, therefore, he leaves a lacuna in his case for realism.
(6) Finally let me ask Prof. Perry to explain wherein lies the
inadequacy of the pragmatic (or ' semi-') realism we are so ready
to concede him, and the superiority of the metaphysical realism
which seems to land him in so many avoidable difficulties.
n.
In discussing next Prof. Perry's treatment of pragmatism, I could
not obviously here go into all the interesting questions he summons
me to answer, even if I had not repeatedly attempted to answer
them elsewhere. I must pick out, therefore, a few conspicuous
points, where his account seems to me to need revision.
(1) I cannot help regarding it as rather a pity that he did not
recognise ' the strict and limited' pragmatism he just mentions on
page 213 of his book, as the root of the whole matter, and show how
all the other pragmatist contentions naturally grow out of it. This
would have bestowed upon his account a unity and connexion
which at present it lacks. But I suppose the temptation to con-
ceive pragmatism metaphysically, instead of psychologically and
logically, and to force it into the categories of ' realism ' and ' ideal-
ism,' proved irresistible.
(2) Had he avoided this error, he would easily have seen his
1
 Cf. James, Psychology, ii., 291. ' Prior to Plato, who mentions it.
3
 Ae has been duly pointed out by Prof. Lovejoy in Journ. of Phxl., ix.,
pp 683-684. Prof. Perry's reply (16., x., p. 460), that such considerations
art) a difficulty to evory sort of philosophy and only point to scepticism,
is an attempt to drive out one bogey by anothor. Nor does it seem to
me sufficient. Besides it is not true, for (as I hare shown) these facts
cnn be fitted quite well into a ' correlation ' view.
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way through the puzzle about ' theory' and ' practice ', and seen
that the pragmatic ontioism of the traditional doctrine is essentially
a denial of the finality of the distinction between the ' theoretic ' and
the 'practical' interests, and that psychological interest forms the
common measure of ' theory' and 'practice'. I have myself protes-
ted so often and so energetically that the distinction between theory
and practice cannot be made absolute, because every thought was an
act am. even the most ' theoretical' assertions were made to gratify
an interest, that I am ashamed to give a long string of references.
But it is clear that this doctrine renders inadequate and irrelevant
Prof. Perry's distinction between the "values whioh ideas have as
instruments of the theoretic interest" and those which they have
" through their service of other interests, such as politics, or through
their subjective emotional effect," together with the whole argument
based upon it.1 For it follows that psychological interest forms a
common measure for all values, which can henceforth compete
with each other. As a fact we find that they do so compete
extensively; a large number and great variety of satisfactions,
which we are at first tempted to regard as wholly ethical, sssthe-
tioal, etc, do lay claim to truth-value as well, and this claim needs
to be examined. But not in a sweeping a priori spirit which
scorns to distinguish the specific cases. It is quite unprofitable to
discuss such questions in the abstract, and apart from an actual
context: no one can predict in a general way what values and
satisfactions will triumph over what, nor yet what ought to; to
deoide any case it is imperative to know the particular case and
its precise circumstances. Surely the failure of Martineau's attempt
to group the ' springs of action' in a fixed order should have
taught us this. All one can do as regards ' theoretic ' truth, there-
fore, is to point to its ' limits'; neither one so uninteresting that
no one could endure the toil of discovering, teaching, or learning
it, nor yet one so deadly that no one could survive believing it, can
permanently establish itself as ' true' in human eyes. That is not
much, but it is something; the rest belongs to the world of action
and real knowing. I may add that the question of what ' theo-
retic ' truths are at present approaching these limits, and so verging
on extinction, is a question of fact: but I fear a good many of them
might be discovered in philosophy.
III.
In Prof. Terry's exegesis of James I must confine myself to two
points: (1) The first concerns the nature of James's ' realism '.
Here Prof. Perry's cue is to distinguish sharply between James
and the other pragmatists and to read his own realism into, and
out of, James's works, and especially the paper on " Does Con-
sciousness Exist?" Hi3 difficulty is that James has explicitly
1
 MUID, No. 88, p. 644.
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repudiated the attempts to separate him from his followers, and
declared that the apparent differences merely meant that he, Dewey
and I were travelling to the same point by different routes.1 Now
to settle this dispute it may ultimately become necessary to go
critically into the meaning of this one paper and of Prof. Perry's
interpretation of it. But at present it will probably suffice to point
out that Prof. Perry is on very unsafe ground, because he is appeal-
ing to a very tentative and relatively early work of James. I do not
know when, and d propos of what, " Does Consciousness Exist ? "
was written, but it was originally published in the Journal of
Philosophy for September, 1904. It is thus not only earlier than
The Meaning of Truth (1909), but also than Pragmatism and
Studies in Humanism (both 1907), while the fact that Prof. Perry
chose to republish it in the last of the volumes of James's essays
which he edited (and from which the important California Address,
which baptised ' Pragmatism' and has long been unprocurable, is
most strangely and inconveniently omitted), clearly does not render
it superior in authority and posterior in doctrine to these works,
though it may mislead a careless reader. It is more probable,
therefore, that this essay represents an experiment in thought
that was not persevered in, and I doubt whether James himself
would ever have republished it as it stood. In case of (real or
alleged) conflict, therefore, with later, maturer and more explicit
expressions of his mind, it would seem to be most unsafe to rely
on one's interpretation of its doctrine.
I may mention further that the review of The Meaning of
Truth in MIND (NO. 74) was read, modified and approved by James
himself before publication, and that I had submitted it to him
because I felt that he might think I had urged the irrelevance of
metaphysics too strongly. This seems to me to create a certain
presumption that the oritioism of metaphysical realism which the
review contains was not repugnant to him ; while the fact that no
realist has so far replied to it naturally inclines me to the belief that
its argument still holds.
(2) My reason for questioning Prof. Perry's account of James's
psychology is simply that he is far too much of a Bussellian to
accept it, or even to recognise the epoch-making originality of
James. He has not seen that the notion of the psychic continuum
is the very nucleus of James's system, and that by means of it he
has antiquated the whole Fragestellung both of psychology and
epistemology, and the weary controversy between ' empiricism '
and ' apriorism,' which until then had been universally accepted
from Hume. For the traditional views ' facts' were by nature
' loose and separate,' and the problem was how to connect them.
Discreteness was conceived as the datum, and ' synthesis ' as the
(semi- or wholly) miraculous function of philosophy, for the sake
of whioh enormous masses of a priori apparatus were usually in-
1
 The Meaning of TruUi, p. 242 f.
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PBOF. PERRY'S REALISM. 395
yoked. James was the first to perceive that all this was fiction,
and futile fiction, to be swept away. For him continuity waa the
true datum, and orderly plurality the achievement, built out of it
by intelligent and experimental selection. It follows that the essen-
tial function of philosophic thought is the analysis of a (relatively)
chaotio continuum. Philosophers in general have been very slow
to perceive the importance of this, though of late it has been re-
markeo repeatedly.1 But there has long been one glorious ex-
ception among philosophers. Henri Bergson had the genius to
perceive that a new metaphysic might be based on a recognition of
cosmic continuity, and his philosophy may fairly be regarded as
the legitimate and logical sequel of transplanting James's aperpu to
blossom in the metaphysical sphere. That these two great thinkers
should have lived to recognise, and to appreciate so nobly, their
affinity is most natural and pleasing; but to convert the final
efflorescence of James's thinking into an ambiguous support of one
of the stalest of philosophic controversies is to reduce it to banality.
F. C. 8. SOHILLEB.
1
 Cf. D. L. Murray, Pragmatism, ohap. ii., and H. V. Knox, MOID, NO.
87, p. 233; No. 88, p. 561. [When this waa written In October last I
could not yet refer also to Captain Knoi's admirable Philosophy of William
Jamts (pp. 34-35), which appears to me to have penetrated to the heart of
James's thought and to have grasped in its full significance his conception
of the relation between his psychology and philosophy.]
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